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BANKRUPTCY REFORM AND ECONOMIC
RECOVERY
G. RAY WARNER*
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, following years of intensive lobbying by the consumer credit
industryl, the focus of the consumer bankruptcy law was changed from the
liberal debtor-focused "fresh start" approach embodied in the 1978
Bankruptcy Code to a creditor-focused "can pay/must pay" approach.
Although the shift to a can pay/must pay system started years earlier to
address perceived abuses,2 the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 20053 ("BAPCPA") completed that shift by
engrafting onto the bankruptcy law a fairly strict and largely objective test
for determining a debtor's ability to repay debt and by setting forth
channeling rules designed to force debtors with a perceived ability to repay
some debt into a lengthy repayment plan.4
The focus of the debate about that change has been on the debtor.
Proponents of the change have phrased the reforms in moralist terms. They
tend to set forth a narrative of widespread moral failure among those
debtors using the bankruptcy system, and they use morally charged terms
like "substantial abuse," rather than more neutral terms like "eligibility" to
* Associate Dean for Bankruptcy Studies and Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
Thanks to my research assistant, Bankruptcy LL.M. candidate, George Klidonas, for his excellent
assistance in researching issues addressed in this essay.
I See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 Am. BANKR. L.J. 485, 498-99 (2005) (noting role of consumer credit
industry in spearheading bankruptcy reform effort).
2 A 1984 amendment to the Bankruptcy Code permitted dismissal of chapter 7 cases for
"substantial abuse" and imposed a requirement that chapter 13 debtors contribute their "disposable
income" to plan payments. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, PUB. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 355 §§ 312, 317, codifiedat 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B)
(2010). These changes were made in response to concerns that non-needy debtors were filing
bankruptcy. See In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989).
3 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
4 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (establishing a "means test" based on disposable income as a requirement
for relief under chapter 7). See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3)-(4) (2010) (incorporating certain § 707(b)
living expense limitations for above-medium income debtors and replacing the 3-year plan provision).
181
JOURNAL OF CIVILRIGH7S& ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:1
describe the debtors determined to have an ability to repay. 5 Opponents of
the change have similarly focused on the debtor, arguing that the
indebtedness causing resort to the bankruptcy system does not equate to
moral failings by debtors and focusing on the debtors' need for relief from
burdensome indebtedness. 6
Largely missing from the debate is consideration of the possible
macroeconomic effects of the 2005 BAPCPA changes to the bankruptcy
law. The purpose of this brief essay is to explore the role that the consumer
bankruptcy system plays in economic recovery after periods of economic
recession like the current "Great Recession." My thesis is that consumer
bankruptcy policy plays an important role in economic recovery and that
the shift to a can pay/must pay system will both dampen and delay recovery
from economic recessions.
Like it or not, at present our economy is driven by consumer spending.
During a recession jobs are lost, incomes fall, debt amounts increase and
asset values decline. As the recession begins to ease, individuals who have
lost jobs or otherwise suffered a decline in income will obtain new jobs or
see their incomes begin to rise. As the newly employed consumers begin
to spend additional income, that spending has a multiplier effect in the
economy, it stimulates additional economic growth and additional jobs and
helps to accelerate the recovery.
As previously unemployed or underemployed consumers7 begin to see
increased income, they will consider bankruptcy as an option to protect
their income from creditor collection actions such as garnishment. The
prior liberal fresh start policy, by permitting debtors to discharge their
debts in chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcies, allowed these newly employed
debtors immediately to begin spending their increased incomes on
consumption rather than debt repayment. That spending helps accelerate
economic recovery.
The BAPCPA amendments, if effective, will instead divert almost all of
the newly-employed debtors' discretionary income from consumption to
debt repayment, and it will do so for a period of five years. Since debt
repayment has a very low multiplier effect, the macroeconomic effect of
5 See, e.g., Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV.
177 (1999).
6 See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of
Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008).
7 As of October 2009, the national unemployment rate was more than 10 percent, with the
underemployment rate standing at nearly 18 percent. Economic News Release, Alternative Measures of
Labor Underutilization, Bureau of Labor Statistics (November 6, 2009), available at http://data.bls.gov
/cgi-bin/print.pl/news.release/empsit.tl5.htm (last modified May 07, 2010).
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the BAPCPA change to a can pay/must pay bankruptcy system will be to
both reduce and greatly delay the economic stimulus effects of the
increased income received by deeply indebted consumers. With more than
1.3 million U.S. households filing personal bankruptcy in the past year,8
the effect of this change in bankruptcy could be significant.
Additionally, the bankruptcy change likely has a shadow effect that
extends well beyond merely those individuals who actually file bankruptcy.
The lack of a viable bankruptcy alternative for many debtors provides
incentives for creditors to take more aggressive steps to collect debts that
otherwise would have been charged off or renegotiated and the likely
bankruptcy outcome shapes the private debt restructuring negotiations
between consumer debtors and their creditors. 9 Further, since BAPCPA
diverts all additional discretionary income to debt repayment for five years,
it reduces the incentives of deeply indebted individualsIO to seek additional
income.
The bankruptcy system has long been an important tool for dealing with
economic crises by allowing overly indebted individuals to start fresh as
economic actors following periods of depression or recession. A similar
credit industry sponsored can pay/must pay approach that also was based
on claims of abuse by consumer debtors was rejected during the Great
Depression. IIHowever, with BAPCPA, the consumer credit industry finally
got its wish-just in time for the Great Recession. While the idea that the
discharge of debt in bankruptcy might be good for the economy seems
counter-intuitive, a morally appealing can pay/must pay system may cause
far more harm than good.
8 Despite the current law's can pay/must pay approach that limits the benefits of bankruptcy relief,
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that 1,344,095 non-business bankruptcy cases were
filed during the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009. James C. Duff, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States, 2009 Annual Report of the Director 291
tbl. F-2 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx
?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (last visited May 27,
2010).
9 For example, the absence of an ability to force a write down of mortgage debts in bankruptcy has
given mortgage lenders no incentive to negotiate realistic mortgage restructuring agreements.
10 With consumer debt levels are at near record highs, a large segment of the consumer population
is deeply indebted. Household consumer debt represented 122% of disposable personal income in 2008,
down from a high of 128.1% in 2007. In contrast, household consumer debt represented only 76.1% of
disposable personal income in 1990. See Mark Jickling, Consumer Bankruptcy and Household Debt
(Oct. 22, 2008), available at www. Bna.com/webwatch/bankruptcycrs3.pdf (last visited May 27, 2010).
11 Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 5, 27 (1995) (discussing the rejection of a can pay/must pay approach to discharge during the
Great Depression).
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I. HISTORICAL USES AS A RECOVERY TOOL
For much of our history, there was no federal bankruptcy law. Up until
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, federal bankruptcy laws were passed in
response to serious economic crises and were of short duration. As
Professor Tabb has explained:
Each instance of federal legislation followed a major financial
disaster: the Act of 1800 followed the Panic of 1797; the Act of 1841
followed the Panic of 1837; the 1867 Act followed the Panic of 1857
and the Civil War; and finally the 1898 Act was passed in the wake of
the Panic of 1893.12
Although these laws generally dealt with business debtors, consumer
spending was not a major pillar of the American economy so discharge of
business persons was necessary to restart economic activity. For example,
although the Panic of 1797 "caused widespread financial ruin and the
imprisonment of thousands of debtors," the Act of 1800 provided an
opportunity to discharge those debts and allowed many financiers and
speculators to resume their earlier activities. 13
The practice of using bankruptcy laws to address economic crises
continued even after the bankruptcy law became permanent in 1898.
During the Great Depression, Congress passed several pro-debtor
amendments designed to address the effects of the Great Depression.
Although some of these measures were stricken down by the Supreme
Court, the effort to reshape bankruptcy law into a tool for financial
rehabilitation culminated in the passage of the Chandler Act in 1938.14
Unlike the BAPCPA amendments, the primary focus of and impetus for the
pre-Code bankruptcy laws was to deal with general economic calamity,
rather than the relief needed by particular debtors.
The basic structure set forth by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the
Chandler Act amendments endured until the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. The
Bankruptcy Code was the product of years of study to modernize the
bankruptcy laws and represented the first major bankruptcy legislation that
was not a response to some economic crisis.
12 Id. at 14.
13 Id. at 14-15. Among those affected by the Panic were Robert Morris, a principle financier of the
revolution who was imprisoned because of $12 million in debts, and a Supreme Court Justice, who had
to flee to avoid imprisonment. Id. at 14.
14 Id at 29 (highlighting the changes brought on by the Chandler Act).
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II. EROSION OF THE FRESH START
The Bankruptcy Code represented the high water mark for the liberal
consumer debtor fresh start policy. Although the modem liberal discharge
and fresh start policy was embodied in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the
1978 Bankruptcy Code expanded the scope of relief available to individual
debtors. Initially, there were only a few limited types of debts that were
excepted from discharge and a consumer debtor could obtain a broad
discharge under chapter 7 once every six years in exchange for turning over
his or her non-exempt assets.15 Although a consumer debtor could choose
to file a chapter 13 bankruptcy and repay some or all debt through a
voluntary repayment plan, the chapter 7 "walk away" discharge allowed
consumer debtors to protect all of their future income from creditors,
regardless of ability to repay.
A series of amendments over time both limited the scope of the
discharge and imposed some restrictions on the ability of debtors to obtain
a walk away discharge. The precursor to BAPCPA was a 1984 amendment
that allowed the bankruptcy court to dismiss a chapter 7 petition if the
granting of chapter 7 relief constituted a "substantial abuse", and that
required chapter 13 debtors to contribute their disposable income to the
debt repayment plan under certain circumstances. 16 Although there was a
statutory presumption in favor of the debtor's choice of chapter 7 relief,
courts mostly ignored the presumption and eventually focused on the
ability to repay debts as a primary factor for determining substantial
abuse. 17 This had the effect of adding a mild can pay/must pay feature to
consumer bankruptcy because debtors with a substantial ability to repay
their debts were forced into a chapter 13 repayment plan or out of
bankruptcy altogether. However, the effects of that change on the
economic impact of bankruptcy was limited for several reasons: first, the
courts generally used a subjective reasonableness test based in part on the
debtor's pre-bankruptcy standard of living to determine the debtor's
reasonable living expense allowance and how much disposable income was
available for debt repayment; second, the required duration of the chapter
15 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)-(9) (2010) (listing types of debt excepted from discharge); II U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(8) (2010) (noting that discharge will not be granted if a case was commenced under chapter 7
or 11 within 8 years of the new filing); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 363, 384-85 (1977).
16 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, PUB. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
355 (1984).
17 See David B. Harrison, Bankruptcy: When Does Filing of Chapter 7 Petition Constitute
"Substantial Abuse" Authorizing Dismissal of Petition Under II U.S. C. § 707(b), 122 A.L.R. FED. 141
§ 2(a) (1994) (noting that courts focus on the ability to repay in determining substantial abuse).
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13 plan was only three years, rather than the current five year repayment
period; and third, the substantial abuse test generally required a showing
that the debtor had the ability to repay a substantial part of his or her debts
through a chapter 13 plan and considered a variety of factors in addition to
ability to repay debt.18
In contrast, BAPCPA replaced the mild can pay/must pay approach with
a very strict approach. Linguistically, the prior "substantial abuse"
standard for dismissing a chapter 7 case was replaced with a mere "abuse"
standard. Further, the statutory presumption in favor of the debtor's choice
of chapter 7 relief was removed. More importantly, the bankruptcy court's
subjective determination of disposable income was replaced with a largely
objective test based on the relatively frugal living allowances set forth in
the IRS Collection Standards. For most categories of expenses, the
debtor's disposable income is determined based on national or local
averages, and not on the actual expenses of the debtor or the needs of the
debtor's family. Subtraction of the monthly living allowance from the
debtor's available income produces a figure for "disposable income" that is
deemed to be available for debt repayment. The most extreme feature of
the new test is that the debtor is deemed to be abusing chapter 7 if that
calculation shows disposable income of as little as $182.5 per month and,
in some cases, as little as $109.58 per month.19
If the very low threshold of $182.50 per month in disposable income is
reached, then the debtor's only bankruptcy choice is to enter into a
repayment plan under chapter 13.20 That plan must then commit all of the
debtor's "projected disposable income" to debt repayment for a period of
the next five years. The combined effect of these provisions is to divert the
discretionary income of most middle and upper income debtors from
consumption to debt repayment. This removes that income from the
consumer economy and deprives the economy of the stimulus effect that
such income would otherwise have.21 Indeed, since the threshold is
18 See id (discussing some of the limitations of forcing chapter 7 debtors into chapter 13).
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(l)-(ll) (2010). Chapter 7 petitions filed by debtors earning less
than the median income are not subject to the mechanical test, but can be dismissed under a more
subjective abuse standard. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1), (b)(7A) (2010). The exclusion of these debtors
from the mechanical formula should have little impact on the economic effect of the bankruptcy law
because they likely have very little discretionary income.
20 A chapter 11 repayment plan is also an option for some debtors, but the disposable income
requirements of a chapter 11 plan for a non-business debtor are virtually identical to the chapter 13 plan
requirements.
21 The test's exclusion of regularly scheduled secured debt repayments (e.g., monthly mortgage
payments and car loan payments) from disposable income will permit many middle and upper class
debtors to qualify for chapter 7 relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(I), (iii) (2010). However, in those
cases the income still is being diverted to debt repayment rather than new consumption. Further, since
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determined by objective IRS allowance amounts, which in some cases may
not be sufficient to provide the household's reasonable support needs,
BAPCPA may in some cases remove income from the system that is not
really disposable. Further, the BAPCPA effect will continue for the first
five years of economic recovery, delaying the full reentry of these
households into the consumer economy during a critical phase of the
recovery.
While the present analysis is limited to the economic effects of debt
repayment within the bankruptcy system, a complete analysis would
include consideration of the shadow effects of the change in bankruptcy
law on debtors who do not file bankruptcy. The BAPCPA changes make
bankruptcy relief unattractive for most can pay debtors and may make it
completely unavailable in those cases where the allowances are too low to
meet the needs of the debtor's family. Those can pay debtors who chose
not to file bankruptcy will not receive a discharge of their debts and will
not be free to fully reengage in the consumer economy. If they attempt to
repay their debts either voluntarily or as a response to creditor actions, the
diversion of income from consumption to debt repayment will be similar to
that accomplished within bankruptcy by the BAPCPA amendments. The
economic effect may even be worse for such debtors if the creditors'
collection efforts cause additional problems. For example, collection
efforts like garnishment may lead to job losseS22 and the risk of collection
may reduce the debtor's incentives to seek additional income, at least in the
legitimate above-ground sectors of the economy.
III. FISCAL MULTIPLIER EFFECTS
While there is vigorous debate in economic circles about the validity and
accuracy of analyses based on the Keynesian multiplier model,23 the
mortgage and automotive debt cannot be adjusted in bankruptcy even when the value of the asset has
fallen far below the outstanding debt amount, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(9) (2010)
(unnumbered "hanging" paragraph), the repayment of the undersecured portion of these debts is
comparable to repayment of other unsecured debt. This is not a minor point since at present the
principal amount owed on many consumer mortgages exceeds the value of property. See Bob Tedeschi,
Mortgages; The Depths of Mortgage Debt, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2009) (available at http://www.ny
times.com/2009/08/30/realestate/30mort.html?_r-1) (reporting that more than one-third of all
mortgaged homes in the United States were worth less than the mortgage debt amount as of June 2009).
22 While an employer may not discharge an employee because of a garnishment for a single debt,
gamishments based on more than one debt may result in firing. See 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (2010).
Further, continued indebtedness may have a negative impact on employment prospects, credit reports,
and other opportunities that may be worse or last longer than the impact of a bankruptcy filing.
23 See, PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 638-43 (19th ed. 2010
McGraw-Hill Irwin).
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modem mainstream Keynesian approach is "the best way to explain the
business cycle in market economies." 24 The multiplier model posits that
"each dollar change in exogenous expenditure (such as investment) leads to
more than a dollar change (or a multiplied change) in GDP [gross domestic
product]." 25 The reason for this is that an endless, but ever diminishing
chain of secondary consumption spending is set in motion by the primary
investment. 26 The size of the multiplier (i.e., the amount of resulting
change in GDP for each dollar injected) depends on the marginal
propensity to consume [MPC].27 The MPC refers to the portion of any new
income received that will go to consumption, as opposed to "savings." For
example, if we assume that 75% of each new dollar will be spent on
consumption and 25% on savings, then the MPC is .75. If the MPC is .75
and we add $100 to the system, then GDP will grow by $400.28 Of course,
there is a time lag before the entire effect is felt because of the delay
between each successive round of secondary consumption spending. Thus,
most estimates of the fiscal multiplier effects of particular stimulus
measures predict the effect over a specific time period. Nonetheless, since
the multiplier effect is largest in the earliest rounds of secondary
consumption spending, most of the impact comes from the early rounds of
spending.
However, since the demand created by the increase in overall
consumption spending does not by itself increase the available supply of
goods and services, the multiplier effect on GDP would not be observed
during periods when the economy is already operating at full production
capacity, because the economy cannot produce more output regardless of
demand. 29 But, during periods of recession or depression, when there is a
surplus of unused labor and other unused resources, the injection of new
dollars to increase consumption spending will stimulate additional
production, and thereby increase GDP and aid in the recovery from the
recession or depression.
IV. THE FiscAL EFFECT OF DEBT REPAYMENT
So how does the forced repayment of consumer debt affect GDP growth?
24 Id at 638.
25 Id. at 437.
26 Id. at 441.
27 d at 440-41.
28 $100 yields (1.0)(100) + (.75)(100) + (.75)(75) + (.75)(56.25) + ... $400. See PAUL A.
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 441 (19th ed. 2010 McGraw-Hill Irwin).
29 Id
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It does this by diverting part of the debtor's income from consumption to
savings. This reduces the percentage of income available for consumption
and thus reduces the MPC, which in turn reduces the size of the multiplier.
To take the simplest model, a household can devote its personal disposable
income to either consumption or savings. 30 Consumption, or personal
consumption expenditure, is the expenditure by a household on final goods
and services. Savings, as used in this sense is not limited to what might be
considered savings in the common usage of that term, but rather includes
all personal disposable income that is not devoted to consumption.31
Viewed from the fiscal multiplier perspective, savings is leakage from the
system since it represents that part of income that does not generate a
change in GDP (at least in the short term).32
This simple model shows the dampening effect of forced debt repayment
on economic growth. As noted earlier, the BAPCPA standard for abuse
will force above-medium income debtors out of the chapter 7 walk away
bankruptcy process if they are determined to have as little as $182.50 a
month in discretionary income (called "disposable income" in section
707(b)), with that figure being as low as $109.58 per month in some cases.
The only bankruptcy option for these households is to use chapter 13.
However, in chapter 13, they will be required to commit all of their
"projected disposable income" to debt repayment for the next five years,
unless the debt can be fully repaid earlier. While there are some
differences between the "disposable income" used to determine abuse
under section 707(b) and the "projected disposable income" that the debtor
is required to commit to debt repayment during the five year chapter 13
plan, 33 the intended effect of these combined changes is to divert virtually
all discretionary income (i.e., income over the amount necessary for basic
support) from consumption to debt repayment. 34 Since debt repayment is a
form of "savings" and the BAPCPA changes are designed to divert all of
the debtor's disposable income to debt repayment, the debtor's MPC for
income earned in excess of the BAPCPA expense allowance would be
zero. In the simple model, this means that the disposable income received
by deeply indebted individuals in bankruptcy will produce no increase to
30 Id. at 408.
31 See Id.
32 See Id. at 565.
33 See 7 WlLLIAM L. NORTON JR.& WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON'S BANKRUPTCY LAW &
PRACTICE § 151:22, p. 151-117 et seq. (3d ed. 2009).
34 The extent to which this effect materializes turns on how strictly courts interpret and apply these
provisions.
2010] 189
JOURAL OF CIVIL RIGIflS & ECONOMiCDEVELOPMENT [Vol.25:1
GDP during the first five years of the recovery phase.
Of course, this model is too simple and overstates the anti-recovery
effect of the BAPCPA changes. A dollar is a dollar, and one might ask
why a dollar devoted to debt repayment has less economic impact than a
dollar devoted to consumption. Won't the creditor spend part of the dollar
it receives on consumption, just like the producer of the goods or services
would have? Or, might the creditor spend part of the dollar on investment
that would in turn generate future economic growth? The answers to these
questions turn largely on who the creditors are.
For example, if the consumer debtor owes money to another consumer
who has the same MPC as the original consumer, then presumably the
multiplier effect on GDP will be the same for debt repayment as it would
have been for consumption, although that effect may be delayed. However,
if the creditor has a different MPC than the consumer debtor, that could
result in either a higher or lower multiplier effect on GDP. MPC varies by
income level, with wealthier people having a lower MPC than poorer
people. 35 Thus, if one assumes that the holders of consumer debt are
investors with relatively higher incomes than the consumer debtors, then
the BAPCPA changes have a depressive effect on GDP growth, even after
accounting for the income effect of debt repayment on the recipient.
A few examples of multipliers illustrate this point and suggest that
BAPCPA has a negative effect on GDP growth. In February of 2009, the
Congressional Budget Office estimated the range of the multipliers for
transfers to persons (e.g., unemployment compensation) at a high of 2.2 to
a low of 0.8 over several quarters. 36 While the disposable income of
consumer bankruptcy debtors may not be identical to wage replacements
like unemployment compensation, these figures at least provide some idea
of the extent of the multiplier effect of that income. In contrast, the
multipliers for a one year tax cut for high income persons ranged from a
high of only 0.5 to a low of 0.1 over the same period. Again, while tax cuts
may not be identical to debt repayment income for higher income creditors,
these figures suggest that income from debt repayment has a low
35 Samuelson, supra note 24, at 411. See also JOHN M. KEYNES, The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money, 96 (1936) (noting that while aggregate consumption depends on
aggregate income, consumption will not increase at the same rate as income).
36 Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Honorable Judd Gregg,
Comm. on the Budget, U.S. Senate 9 tbl. 2 (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
96xx/doc9619/Gregg.pdf (last visited June 6, 2010); see also Statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf,
Director, Cong. Budget Office, before the House Comm. on the Budget, The State of the Economy and
Issues in Developing an Effective Policy Response 27 tbl. 5 (January 27, 2009), available at http://www.
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9967/01-27-StateofEconomy Testimony.pdf (last visited June 6, 2010).
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multiplier. Multiplier estimates by some private economists similarly
support the proposition that debt repayment has less stimulative impact
than consumption. For example, Mark Zandi, Chief Economist of Moody's
Economy.com, estimates that extended unemployment benefits will have a
multiplier effect of 1.73 in the first year, compared to a first year multiplier
of only .37 for tax cuts on dividends and capital gains, 37 income sources of
the same type as debt repayment income. These figures suggest that the
BAPCPA diversion of disposable income from consumption to debt
repayment has a dampening effect on economic recovery, even assuming
that the consumer debt is held by individuals who may devote at least some
of the repayment income to consumption.
However, the data on consumer debt suggest that only an infinitesimal
amount of consumer debt is held directly by other individuals. Instead,
institutions or investment pools hold almost all of the U.S. consumer
debt.38 Only 1.9% of the outstanding consumer debt is held by non-
financial businesses, 39 a category that might include a significant portion of
high income individuals who might exhibit an MPC similar to the investor
MPC discussed above. An additional 25% of outstanding consumer debt is
held by pools of securitized assets. 40 While the investors in such pools may
include high income individuals, they likely account for only a small
portion of the pool investors and, even then, their investments may be in
the form of pension investments or retirement savings that do not correlate
to current consumption.
More than two thirds of the outstanding consumer debt is held by
financial institutions. Thus, the simple equation needs to be refined further
to account for the impact that repayment of debt to these institutions might
have on domestic GDP growth. While the transfer of debt repayment
income to a commercial bank or other financial institution represents
leakage from the system, it may be offset if those dollars are used by that
institution for additional investment in the domestic economy. Thus, a
somewhat more accurate formula for overall GDP must include both
consumption spending and investment spending. In terms of the effect that
37 Economic Stimulus for Small Business: A Look Back and Assessing Need for Additional Relief
Before the H. Comm. on Small Business, I10th Cong. 5(July 24, 2008) (written testimony of Mark
Zandi, Chief Executive and Co-Founder, Moody's Economy.com).
38 Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19, Consumer Credit September 2009 (November 6,
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/20091106/ (last visited June 7, 2010).
39 Id. $48.3 billion out of the total of $2.465 trillion in outstanding consumer credit was held by
non-financial businesses.
40 Id. $618.3 billion out of the total of $2.465 trillion in outstanding consumer credit was held by
pools of securitized assets.
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BAPCPA has on the economic impact of the debtor's "disposable income"
as defined by bankruptcy law, the formula would be: disposable income
minus debt repayment plus new investment by the creditor. While the
additional investment by the creditor will add to GDP eventually, its impact
will be delayed and will likely only affect longer term GDP growth rates.
Thus, even if one makes the highly improbable assumptions that all of the
diverted income will be reinvested by the financial institutions and that the
total multiplier effect of the investment is the same as the multiplier effect
for consumption, the investment expenditures are unlikely to have much
immediate impact on GDP growth or to assist in the recovery from a
recessionary period.
In the current economic climate, it is clear that the assumption of
reinvestment is not justified. Repayment to pools of securitized assets will
not result in any direct additional investment since those pools are not
designed to reinvest the income they receive. Further, the Great Recession
has caused many financial institutions to fail and left most others in serious
financial difficulty with insufficient capital or insufficient reserves. As a
result, lending to consumers and businesses by financial institutions has
largely dried up. Despite massive infusions of government bailout funds
that were designed to encourage these institutions to begin lending again,
they have mostly failed to do so. 41 Commercial banks hold 33.7% of
outstanding consumer debt, with savings institutions holding an additional
2.9%.42 Consumer debt repayment to these institutions will result in
virtually no additional investment, and no current GDP growth. Finance
companies, which hold an additional 21.2% of the outstanding consumer
debt,43 may be more likely than commercial banks to reinvest debt
repayment income in new loans, but many are similarly in financial
difficulty. Credit unions, which hold 9.8% of the outstanding consumer
debt,44 appear to be in better financial shape than other financial
institutions and may reinvest debt repayment income in additional loans.
Even if this is correct, overall only a very small portion of the income
diverted from consumption to the repayment of debt held by financial
institutions will result in new investment.
The other major holder of U.S. consumer debt is the federal government
41 Testimony of Til Schuermann, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the
Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (May 28, 2009), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/sch090528.html (last visited 1/19/2010).
42 See Federal Reserve Statistical Release supra note 39
43 Id.
44 Id.
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and Sallie Mae, representing 5.4% of the outstanding consumer debt.45
Since the federal government, unlike state governments, is not required to
balance its budget, there is no direct correlation between income received
by the government and government spending. Thus, although government
spending does result in an increase in GDP, the BAPCPA diversion of
income from consumption to the repayment of debt held by the government
does not produce any offsetting increase in GDP.
Finally, the domestic economy is not a closed system. The effect of both
foreign investors and foreign debt holders must be considered in
calculating the impact BAPCPA has on domestic GDP growth. In an open
economy, like ours, the multipliers are lower than in a closed economy
because of the leakage caused by transfers to non-U.S. holders of debt.46
Debt repayment to non-U.S. holders has no stimulative effect on the
domestic economy, except to the extent that the creditor reinvests the debt
repayment income in new investments in the U.S. economy or uses those
funds to consume U.S. exports. In an open economy, both domestic and
foreign holders of U.S. consumer debt are free to invest the additional debt
repayment income provided by BAPCPA in foreign economic ventures. In
both instances, this would represent leakage and reduce the domestic
economic impact of the debtor's disposable income. However, it may be
less likely that foreign holders of debt will repatriate the debt repayment
income to U.S. investment than that domestic holders will. Thus, the
existence of non-U.S. debt holders further reduces the domestic economic
impact of the disposable income earned by debtors in bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
Total domestic economic output, or domestic GDP, is the sum of
consumption, investment, government expenditure and net exports. 47 As
discussed above, the BAPCPA can pay/must pay approach to bankruptcy
retards the economic stimulus impact of the consumer bankruptcy system.
BAPCPA's diversion of disposable income from consumption to debt
repayment reduces the debtor's MPC to zero with respect to that income
for a five year period. The creditors' receipt of extra debt repayment
income does not offset this loss to GDP growth. This is because the
repayment will have little offsetting impact on the investment component
45 Id.
46 Cf SAMUELSON, supra note 24 at 565 (stating that open economy multipliers are lower than
closed economy multipliers).
47 SAMUELSON, supra note 24, at 443,565.
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of GDP, virtually no offsetting impact on the government expenditure
component of GDP, and, depending on the extent of consumer debt held by
non-U.S. entities, may have a negative impact on the net exports
component of domestic GDP. Finally, even to the extent that debt
repayment income is returned to U.S. households, the consumption
component of domestic GDP will be reduced because the debt holders
likely have a much lower MPC than consumer debtors.
While there may be policy reasons to adopt a BAPCPA style can
pay/must pay consumer bankruptcy system, those must be weighed against
the bankruptcy system's role as an economic recovery tool.
